This article appeared in the Dallas Morning News, on Tuesday, January 12, 1982.

A famous rock star has just died and millions of fans are grieving. The computer of a major novelty distributor is immediately put into action, for there is not a moment to lose if the grief is to be fully exploited. From data banks of ticket agencies, record distributors and other firms, the computer compiles names, addresses, purchasing histories and financial backgrounds of people who bought records and attended concerts of the fallen star. Within 48 hours of the tragedy, the novelty company begins computer-dialing phone numbers of thousands of grieving fans. Whenever someone answers, the computer plays excerpts of the dead star’s most emotional records along with a sales pitch for souvenir T-shirts and posters. Instantly, orders are taken and confirmation letters are printed. Within a week, more than a million fans have been reached, and factories have been notified of the number of items to produce. Is this imagined application of computers a smart, efficient business venture? Is it unfair exploitation of people caught in a weak moment? Is the gathering of information on people and the phoning of their homes an unethical invasion of their privacy or a new and commendable business strategy? Such questions and many harder ones are being raised and debated in “computer ethics,” a new field of growing concern to business and industry as well as to all of society.

Computer Crime

One large area of problems is that of computer crime. Computers have been targets of attack – by guns, bombs, screwdrivers, magnets, even simple house keys – that have caused millions of dollars in damages. Computers have been used to embezzle fortunes; to print fraudulent coupons, tickets, deposit slips, bonds, insurance policies; to divert large quantities of merchandise; to establish phony credit ratings, job dossiers, credentials; to steal company secrets, software, even computer time itself. It is important to note, however, that the vast majority of crimes studied by computer ethics did not come into existence with computers. Embezzlement sabotage, fraud and similar misdeeds have existed for centuries, and new technology can always be misused as well as used correctly. In many cases, though, computers have tempted the would-be criminal with powers he could only dream of in the past. With the right passwords and computer know-how, for example, it is possible to rob a bank at home from your own telephone and make off with millions of dollars. No guns, no dangerous confrontations with guards, and the evidence can often be electronically erased without a trace. Even when the culprit is caught, convictions are hard to secure and penalties have usually been extremely light considering the staggering amounts of money or damage involved.

Another large area of concern in computer ethics is that of privacy. There are thousands of data banks in business, government, health care and education, containing all kinds of information on millions of Americans. How much of this information should a business be permitted to compile on its employees? – its potential customers? – its rivals in business? How much of the information stored in the computer of a single company should be readily available to low level employees, middle management and top executives? Surely, a secretary using a computer terminal should not be able to gain information on her boss’ health problems, financial status, promotion prospects. But how much information should the boss be able to compile on the secretary? Should he or she have access to IQ scores, personality profile tests, reports from the company physician and psychologist? Should the company acquire credit card or bank records on its employees and be able to determine where they shop, what doctors they are seeing, what motels they stay in, how they spend their leisure time? Should a company sell names, addresses, phone numbers, salary figures and other information on its employees to other firms to be used for a sales campaign or market analysis? Some answers to questions such as these seem obvious, but others are complicated and debatable. Much work needs to be done in considering the issues. In the mid 1960’s, a major public uproar resulted from a proposal before Congress to create a central bank of information on all Americans. The National Data Center, as it was to be called, would assign an identifying number to each American and then establish a dossier of information from the IRS, Census Bureau, National Center for Health Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of Education and scores of other government data banks. Many people saw this as a menacing first step toward a “Big Brother” government that would meddle in the private lives and business affairs of everyone. Even if government data banks were ignored, however, business and industry taken as a whole have sufficient data on most Americans to enable an information thief to compile very full dossiers on his victims. Imagine that an unscrupulous person gains access to the files of doctors, psychiatrists, banks, credit bureaus, personnel offices, lawyers, accountants, insurance companies and so on. The result could be powerful tools for harassment, blackmail, repression, political control, to name but a few possibilities. In a recent conversation, however, Harold Fleisher of International Business Machines Corp.’s data systems division noted that great fears about data security and limited access may be a bit premature. As computer systems have become more complicated, he said, the “interface technology” needed to make them easily useable has led to increasingly effective safeguards, making it harder and harder for unauthorized persons to get information to which they are not entitled. Indeed, according to Walter Maner of the Institute of Applied Ethics at Old Dominion University, our ability to use “secret codes” to store and transfer information is becoming so effective that we may include the question of who has the right to conceal the truth and under what circumstances. Does anyone ever have the right to bury the truth so effectively that it can never be known again?

Decision Making

A third important area of computer ethics concerns responsibility and decision-making. Sometimes a business may try to excuse a billing mistake or other problems by calling it a “computer error.” But these days it is highly unlikely that sophisticated computer hardware will malfunction without catching the mistake. So-called “computer errors” are caused, in most cases, by a person who has entered the wrong information or pushed the wrong button or written a flawed program. In a complex computer system involving many people with a variety of roles, programs, data banks, input terminals, processors and so on, it can become a major problem – both practical and theoretical – to decide who is responsible or liable for the proper functioning of the system. Such problems become even more complicated when computers begin to make decisions that previously were made by people. More and more business management decisions are being automated by computer – when to order more supplies, which ones to order, when to mail overdue notices or cut off electricity or deny someone credit, and so on. If an elderly couple freezes to death in their home because an electric company’s computer has issued a cutoff order, who is responsible?

Computer crime, privacy and responsibility are only three broad areas of computer ethics. There are many others. Deborah Johnson, of the Center for Study of the Human Dimension of Science technology at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, is writing a book on computer ethics that also includes discussion of the ownership and copyrighting of ideas, the impact of computers on human autonomy, and a variety of additional issues. In his course “The Ethical and Social Impact of Computing” at Dartmouth, Stephen Garlan, chairman of the program in computer and information science, includes such topics as the impact of computers on organizations and work patterns, and government related issues like national security and the concentration of political power. At the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at Illinois Institute of technology, John Snappers’ course, “Moral Issues in Computer Science,” deals as well with ethical codes of computer societies. These courses and centers, and a handful of others across the nation, represent the early stages of a discipline that will grow rapidly in the next few years.

Wiener’s cybernetic view of human nature emphasized the physical structure of the human body and the tremendous potential for learning and creative action that human physiology makes possible. To underscore this fact, he often compared human physiology with that of less intelligent creatures like insects:

Cybernetics takes the view that the structure of the machine or of the organism is an index of the performance that may be expected from it. The fact that the mechanical rigidity of the insect is such as to limit its intelligence while the mechanical fluidity of the human being provides for his almost indefinite intellectual expansion is highly relevant to the point of view of this book… man’s advantage over the rest of nature is that he has the physiological and hence the intellectual equipment to adapt himself to radical changes in his environment. The human species is strong only insofar as it takes advantage of the innate, adaptive, learning faculties that its physiological structure makes possible. (Wiener 1954, pp. 57-58, italics in the original [see endnote*])

On the basis of his “cybernetic” analysis of human nature, Wiener concluded that the purpose of a human life is to flourish as the kind of information-processing being that humans naturally are:

I wish to show that the human individual, capable of vast learning and study, which may occupy almost half of his life, is physically equipped, as the ant is not, for this capacity. Variety and possibility are inherent in the human sensorium – and are indeed the key to man’s most noble flights – because variety and possibility belong to the very structure of the human organism. (Wiener 1954, pp. 51)

A good human life, according to Wiener, is one in which “great human values” are realized – one in which the creative and flexible information-processing potential of “the human sensorium” enables humans to reach their full promise in variety and possibility of action. Different people, of course, have various levels of talent and possibility, so one person’s achievements will differ from another’s. It is possible to lead a good human life in an indefinitely large number of ways: as a public servant or statesman, a teacher or scholar, a scientist or engineer, a musician, an artist, a tradesman, an artisan, and so on.

Wiener’s view of the purpose of a human life leads him to adopt what he calls “great principles of justice” upon which a society should be built – principles that, in his view, would maximize a person’s ability to flourish through variety and flexibility in human action. To highlight Wiener’s “great principles of justice”, let us call them “The Principle of Freedom”, “The Principle of Equality” and “The Principle of Benevolence”. (Wiener himself does not assign names but merely states them.) Using Wiener’s own definitions for these key ethical principles, we get the following list (1954, pp. 105-106):

The Principle of Freedom – Justice requires “the liberty of each human being to develop in his freedom the full measure of the human possibilities embodied in him.”

The Principle of Equality – Justice requires “the equality by which what is just for A and B remains just when the positions of A and B are interchanged.”

The Principle of Benevolence – Justice requires “a good will between man and man that knows no limits short of those of humanity itself.”

Wiener’s cybernetic account of human nature leads to the view that people are fundamentally social beings who can reach their full potential only by actively participating in communities of similar beings. Society, therefore, is essential to a good human life. But society can be despotic and oppressive, and thereby limit, or even stifle, freedom; so Wiener introduced a principle to limit, as much as possible, society’s negative impact upon freedom. (Let us name it “The Principle of Minimum Infringement of Freedom. ”)

The Principle of Minimum Infringement of Freedom – “What compulsion the very existence of the community and the state may demand must be exercised in such a way as to produce no unnecessary infringement of freedom”. (1954, p.106)

If one accepts Wiener’s account of human nature and the good society, it follows that many different cultures, with a wide diversity of customs, religions, languages and practices, can provide an appropriate context for human fulfillment and a good life. Indeed, given Wiener’s view that “variety and possibility belong to the very structure of the human organism”, he presumably would expect and encourage the existence of a broad diversity of cultures in the world to maximize the possibilities for choice and creative action. The primary restriction that Wiener would impose on any society would be that it should provide the kind of context in which humans can realize their full potential as sophisticated information-processing agents; and he believed this to be possible only where significant freedom, equality and human compassion hold sway.

So-called “ethical relativists” often point to the wide diversity of cultures in the world – with various religions, laws, codes, values and practices – as evidence that there is no “global ethics”, no underlying universal ethical foundation. Wiener, on the other hand, has a powerful and creative response to such skeptics. His account of human nature and the purpose of a human life can embrace and welcome the rich diversity of cultures and practices that relativists are fond of citing. At the same time, though, Wiener can advocate an underlying ethical foundation for all societies and cultures.

Wiener’s suggested methodology for analyzing and solving computer ethics questions is one that, essentially, assimilates new ethical judgments and new cases into the existing cluster of laws, rules, practices and principles that govern human behavior in the society in question. The key elements of this approach are the following:

Human Purpose – Ethical judgments and practices must be grounded in the overall purpose of a human life: a society and the rules which govern its members must make it possible for people to flourish – to reach their full potential in variety and possibility of action.

Principles of Justice – The Principle of Freedom, the Principle of Equality and the Principle of Benevolence should guide and inform every person’s judgments and practices; and society must neither permit nor impose unnecessary limitations upon individual freedom.

Clarity of Concepts and Rules – The meanings of ethical concepts and rules, in a given situation, should be clear and unambiguous. If they are not, one must undertake to clarify their meanings to the extent possible.

Precedent and Tradition – New ethical judgments and cases should be assimilated, where possible, into the existing body of cases, rules, laws, policies and practices.

For any given society, there will be a “cluster” of existing laws, rules, principles and practices to govern human behavior within that society. These form a complex and extremely rich set of overlapping, crisscrossing policies that constitute a “received policy cluster” (see Bynum and Schubert 1997). This received cluster of policies should be the starting point for developing an answer to any computer ethics question.

If a given case or question does not fit easily into the existing set of rules and policies in one’s society, then one must either (1) make adjustments in the old policies and rules to accommodate the new case, or else (2) introduce a totally new policy to cover the new kind of case. Presumably, if such a new case were to arise, one would have to use the overall purpose of a human life, together with the fundamental principles of justice, to create and justify new laws and policies consistent with the old ones. Such a case would be an example of James Moor’s classic “policy vacuum” for which one must formulate and justify new policies. (See Moor 1985.)

Given these elements of ethical analysis, Wiener’s methodology can be construed as including the following five steps:

Step One: Identify an ethical question or case regarding the integration of ICT into society.

Step Two: Clarify any ambiguous concepts or rules that may apply to the case in question.

Step Three: If possible, apply existing policies (principles, laws, rules, practices) that govern human behavior in the given society. Use precedent and traditional interpretation in such a way as to assimilate the new case or policy into the existing set of social policies and practices.

Step Four: If precedent and existing traditions are insufficient to settle the question or deal with the case, revise the old policies or create new ones, using “the great principles of justice” and the purpose of a human life to guide the effort.

Step Five: Answer the question or deal with the case using the revised or enriched policies.

It is important to note that this method of doing of computer ethics need not involve the expertise of a trained philosopher. In any just society, a successfully functioning adult will be familiar with the laws, rules, customs, and practices that normally govern one’s behavior in that society and enable one to tell whether a proposed action or policy would be considered ethical. Thus, all those in society who must cope with the introduction of ICT – whether they be public policy makers, ICT professionals, business people, workers, teachers, parents, or others – can and should engage in computer ethics by helping to integrate ICT ethically into society. Computer ethics, understood in this very broad way, is too vast and too important to be left only to academics or to ICT professionals.

Wiener makes it clear that, in his view, the integration of ICT into society will constitute the remaking of society – “the second industrial revolution” and “the automatic age”– destined to affect every walk of life. It is bound to be a multi-faceted, on-going process, which will take decades of effort and will radically change the world. In Wiener’s words, we are “here in the presence of another social potentiality of unheard-of importance for good and for evil.” (1948, p. 27) The defining goal of computer ethics, then, is to advance and facilitate the good consequences of ICT while preventing or minimizing the harmful ones.

Today, the ethical importance of the computer revolution – stressed by Norbert Wiener more than fifty years ago – has become obvious. The “information age” is emerging, and the metaphysical and scientific foundation for computer ethics that Wiener laid down decades ago can still provide effective tools and guidance as we confront a wide diversity of challenging new ethical issues.

Endnote
*Quotations from Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Beings are all from the 1954 Second Edition Revised.

References

• Terrell Ward Bynum (1999), “The Foundation of Computer Ethics”, Keynote Address at AICEC99 (The Australian Institute of Computer Ethics Conference 1999), Melbourne, Australia, July 1999.
• Terrell Ward Bynum and Petra Schubert (1997), “How to Do Computer Ethics – A Case Study: The Electronic Mall Bodensee” in Jeroen van den Hoven, ed., Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry, Erasmus University Press, 1997, pp. 85-95. (Proceedings of CEPE 97)
• James H. Moor (1985), “What Is Computer Ethics” in Terrell Ward Bynum, ed., Computers and Ethics, Blackwell, 1985, pp. 266-275. (Published as the October 1985 issue of Metaphilosophy.)
• Norbert Wiener (1948), Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, John Wiley, 1948.
• Norbert Wiener (1950, 1954), The Human Use of Human Beings, Houghton Mifflin, 1950. Second Edition Revised, Doubleday Anchor, 1954.

The Foundation of Computer Ethics

Computer ethics as a field of study was founded by MIT professor Norbert Wiener during World War Two (early 1940s) while helping to develop an antiaircraft cannon capable of shooting down fast warplanes. One part of the cannon had to “perceive” and track an airplane, then calculate its likely trajectory and “talk” to another part of the cannon to fire the shells. The engineering challenge of this project caused Wiener and some colleagues to create a new branch of science, which Wiener called “cybernetics” – the science of information feedback systems. The concepts of cybernetics, when combined with the digital computers being created at that time, led Wiener to draw some remarkably insightful ethical conclusions. He perceptively foresaw revolutionary social and ethical consequences. In 1948, for example, in his book Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine, he said the following:

It has long been clear to me that the modern ultra-rapid computing machine was in principle an ideal central nervous system to an apparatus for automatic control; and that its input and output need not be in the form of numbers or diagrams but might very well be, respectively, the readings of artificial sense organs, such as photoelectric cells or thermometers, and the performance of motors or solenoids…. we are already in a position to construct artificial machines of almost any degree of elaborateness of performance. Long before Nagasaki and the public awareness of the atomic bomb, it had occurred to me that we were here in the presence of another social potentiality of unheard-of importance for good and for evil. (pp. 27 – 28)

In 1950 Wiener published his monumental computer ethics book, The Human Use of Human Beings, which not only established him as the founder of computer ethics, but far more importantly, laid down a comprehensive computer ethics foundation which remains today – half a century later – a powerful basis for computer ethics research and analysis. (However, he did not use the name “computer ethics” to describe what he was doing.) His book includes (1) an account of the purpose of a human life, (2) four principles of justice, (3) a powerful method for doing applied ethics, (4) discussions of the fundamental questions of computer ethics, and (5) examples of key computer ethics topics. (Wiener 1950/1954, see also Bynum 1999)

Wiener made it clear that, on his view, the integration of computer technology into society will constitute the remaking of society – the “second industrial revolution” – destined to affect every major aspect of life. The computer revolution will be a multifaceted, ongoing process that will take decades of effort and will radically change everything. Such a vast undertaking will necessarily include a wide diversity of tasks and challenges. Workers must adjust to radical changes in the work place; governments must establish new laws and regulations; industry and business must create new policies and practices; professional organizations must develop new codes of conduct for their members; sociologists and psychologists must study and understand new social and psychological phenomena; and philosophers must rethink and redefine old social and ethical concepts.

Neglect, Then a Reawakening

Unfortunately, this complex and important new area of applied ethics, which Wiener founded in the 1940s, remained nearly undeveloped and unexplored until the mid 1960s. By then, important social and ethical consequences of computer technology had already become manifest, and interest in computer-related ethical issues began to grow. Computer-aided bank robberies and other crimes attracted the attention of Donn Parker, who wrote books and articles on computer crime and proposed to the Association for Computing Machinery that they adopt a code of ethics for their members. The ACM appointed Parker to head a committee to create such a code, which was adopted by that professional organization in 1973. (The ACM Code was revised in the early 1980s and again in the early 1990s.)

Also in the mid 1960s, computer-enabled invasions of privacy by “big-brother” government agencies became a public worry and led to books, articles, government studies, and proposed privacy legislation. By the mid 1970s, new privacy laws and computer crime laws had been enacted in America and in Europe, and organizations of computer professionals were adopting codes of conduct for their members. At the same time, MIT computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum created a computer program called ELIZA, intended to crudely simulate “a Rogerian psychotherapist engaged in an initial interview with a patient.” Weizenbaum was appalled by the reaction that people had to his simple computer program. Some psychiatrists, for example, viewed his results as evidence that computers will soon provide automated psychotherapy; and certain students and staff at MIT even became emotionally involved with the computer and shared their intimate thoughts with it! Concerned by the ethical implications of such a response, Weizenbaum wrote the book Computer Power and Human Reason (1976), which is now considered a classic in computer ethics.

A “New” Branch of Applied Ethics

In 1976, while teaching a medical ethics course, Walter Maner noticed that, often, when computers are involved in medical ethics cases, new ethically important considerations arise. Further examination of this phenomenon convinced Maner that there is need for a separate branch of applied ethics, which he dubbed “computer ethics.” (Wiener had not used this term, nor was it in common use before Maner.) Maner defined computer ethics as that branch of applied ethics which studies ethical problems “aggravated, transformed or created by computer technology.” He developed a university course, traveled around America giving speeches and conducting workshops at conferences, and published A Starter Kit for Teaching Computer Ethics. By the early 1980s, the name “computer ethics” had caught on, and other scholars began to develop this “new” field of applied ethics.

Among those whom Maner inspired in 1978 was a workshop attendee, Terrell Ward Bynum (the present author). In 1979, Bynum developed curriculum materials and a university course, and in the early 1980s gave speeches and ran workshops at a variety of conferences across America. In 1983, as Editor of the journal Metaphilosophy, he launched an essay competition to generate interest in computer ethics and to create a special issue of the journal. In 1985, that special issue – entitled Computers and Ethics – was published; and it quickly became the widest-selling issue in the journal’s history. The lead article – and winner of the essay competition – was James Moor’s now-classic essay, “What Is Computer Ethics?.” where he described computer ethics like this:

A typical problem in computer ethics arises because there is a policy vacuum about how computer technology should be used. Computers provide us with new capabilities and these in turn give us new choices for action. Often, either no policies for conduct in these situations exist or existing policies seem inadequate. A central task of computer ethics is to determine what we should do in such cases, i.e., to formulate policies to guide our actions. Of course, some ethical situations confront us as individuals and some as a society. Computer ethics includes consideration of both personal and social policies for the ethical use of computer technology. (p. 266)

In Moor’s view computer ethics includes, (1) identification of computer-generated policy vacuums, (2) clarification of conceptual muddles, (3) formulation of policies for the use of computer technology, and (4) ethical justification of such policies.

A Standard-setting Textbook

1985 was a watershed year for computer ethics, not only because of the special issue of Metaphilosophy and Moor’s classic article, but also because Deborah Johnson published the first major textbook in the field (Computer Ethics), as well as an edited collection of readings with John Snapper (Ethical Issues in the Use of Computers). Johnson’s book Computer Ethics rapidly established itself as the standard-setting textbook in university courses, and it set the research agenda in computer ethics for nearly a decade.

In her book, Johnson defined computer ethics as a field which examines ways that computers “pose new versions of standard moral problems and moral dilemmas, exacerbating the old problems, and forcing us to apply ordinary moral norms in uncharted realms.” (p. 1) Unlike Maner (see Maner 1996), with whom she had discussed computer ethics in the late 1970s, Johnson did not think that computers created wholly new ethical problems, but rather gave a “new twist” to already familiar issues such as ownership, power, privacy and responsibility.

Exponential Growth

Since 1985, the field of computer ethics has grown exponentially. New university courses, research centers, conferences, articles and textbooks have appeared, and a wide diversity of additional scholars and topics have become involved. For example, thinkers like Donald Gotterbarn, Keith Miller, Simon Rogerson, and Dianne Martin – as well as organizations like Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and ACM-SIGCAS – have spearheaded developments relevant to computing and professional responsibility. Developments in Europe and Australia have been especially noteworthy, including new research centers in England, Poland, Holland, and Italy; the ETHICOMP series of conferences led by Simon Rogerson and the present writer; the CEPE conferences founded by Jeroen van den Hoven; and the Australian Institute of Computer Ethics headed by John Weckert and Chris Simpson.

The Future of Computer Ethics?

Given the explosive growth of computer ethics during the past two decades, the field appears to have a very robust and significant future. How can it be, then, that two important thinkers – Krystyna Górniak-Kocikowska and Deborah Johnson – have recently argued that computer ethics will disappear as a branch of applied ethics?

The Górniak Hypothesis – In her 1995 ETHICOMP paper, Górniak predicted that computer ethics, which is currently considered just a branch of applied ethics, will eventually evolve into something much more. It will evolve into a system of global ethics applicable in every culture on earth:

Just as the major ethical theories of Bentham and Kant were developed in response to the printing press revolution, so a new ethical theory is likely to emerge from computer ethics in response to the computer revolution. The newly emerging field of information ethics, therefore, is much more important than even its founders and advocates believe. (p. 177)

The very nature of the Computer Revolution indicates that the ethic of the future will have a global character. It will be global in a spatial sense, since it will encompass the entire Globe. It will also be global in the sense that it will address the totality of human actions and relations. (p.179)

Computers do not know borders. Computer networks… have a truly global character. Hence, when we are talking about computer ethics, we are talking about the emerging global ethic. (p. 186)

…the rules of computer ethics, no matter how well thought through, will be ineffective unless respected by the vast majority of or maybe even all computer users. This means that in the future, the rules of computer ethics should be respected by the majority (or all) of the human inhabitants of the Earth…. In other words, computer ethics will become universal, it will be a global ethic. (p.187)

According to the Górniak hypothesis, “local” ethical theories like Europe’s Benthamite and Kantian systems and the ethical systems of other cultures in Asia, Africa, the Pacific Islands, etc., will eventually be superseded by a global ethics evolving from today’s computer ethics. “Computer” ethics, then, will become the “ordinary” ethics of the information age.

The Johnson Hypothesis – In her 1999 ETHICOMP paper, Deborah Johnson expressed a view which, upon first sight, may seem to be the same as Górniak’s:

I offer you a picture of computer ethics in which computer ethics as such disappears…. We will be able to say both that computer ethics has become ordinary ethics and that ordinary ethics has become computer ethics. (Pp. 17 – 18)

But a closer look at the Johnson hypothesis reveals that it is very different from Górniak’s. On Górniak’s view, the computer revolution will eventually lead to a new ethical system, global and cross-cultural in nature. The new “ethics for the information age,” according to Górniak, will supplant parochial theories like Bentham’s and Kant’s – theories based on relatively isolated cultures in Europe, Asia, Africa, and other “local” regions of the globe.

Johnson’s hypothesis, in reality, is essentially the opposite of Górniak’s. It is another way of stating Johnson’s often-defended view that computer ethics concerns “new species of generic moral problems.” It assumes that computer ethics, rather than replacing theories like Bentham’s and Kant’s, will continue to presuppose them. Current ethical theories and principles, according to Johnson, will remain the bedrock foundation of ethical thinking and analysis, and the computer revolution will not lead to a revolution in ethics.

At the dawn of the 21st century, then, computer ethics thinkers have offered the world two very different views of the likely ethical relevance of computer technology. The Wiener-Maner-Górniak point of view sees computer technology as ethically revolutionary, requiring human beings to reexamine the foundations of ethics and the very definition of a human life. The more conservative Johnson perspective is that fundamental ethical theories will remain unaffected – that computer ethics issues are simply the same old ethics questions with a new twist – and consequently computer ethics as a distinct branch of applied philosophy will ultimately disappear.

References

• Terrell Ward Bynum, ed. (1985), Computers and Ethics, Basil Blackwell (published as the October 1985 issue of Metaphilosophy).
• Terrell Ward Bynum (1999), “The Foundation of Computer Ethics,” a keynote address at the AICEC99 Conference, Melbourne, Australia, July 1999.
• Krystyna Górniak-Kocikowska (1996), “The Computer Revolution and the Problem of Global Ethics” in Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon Rogerson, eds., Global Information Ethics, Opragen Publications, 1996, pp. 177 – 190, (the April 1996 issue of Science and Engineering Ethics)
• Deborah G. Johnson (1985), Computer Ethics, Prentice-Hall. (Second Edition 1994).
• Deborah G. Johnson (1999), “Computer Ethics in the 21st Century,” a keynote address at ETHICOMP99, Rome, Italy, October 1999.
• Deborah G. Johnson and John W. Snapper, eds. (1985), Ethical Issues in the Use of Computers, Wadsworth.
• Walter Maner (1978), Starter Kit on Teaching Computer Ethics (Self published in 1978. Republished in 1980 by Helvetia Press in cooperation with the National Information and Resource Center for Teaching Philosophy).
• Maner, Walter (1996), “Unique Ethical Problems in Information Technology,” in Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon Rogerson, eds., Global Information Ethics, Opragen Publications, 1996, pp. 137 – 52, (the April 1996 issue of Science and Engineering Ethics).
• James H. Moor (1985), “What Is Computer Ethics?” in Terrell Ward Bynum, ed. (1985), Computers and Ethics, Basil Blackwell, pp. 266 – 275.
• Joseph Weizenbaum (1976), Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation, Freeman.
• Norbert Wiener (1948), Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, Technology Press.
• Norbert Wiener (1950/1954), The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, Houghton Mifflin, 1950. (Second Edition Revised, Doubleday Anchor, 1954. This later edition is better and more complete from a computer ethics point of view.)

The track address is “Computer Security and Human Values” by Peter G. Neumann; and the commentaries include: “On Computer Security and Public Trust” by William Hugh Murray, “The End of the (Ab)User Friendly Era” by Sanford Sherizen, “Responsibility and Blame in Computer Security” by Dorothy E. Denning, and “Computer Crime, Computer Security and Human Values” by Kenneth C. Citarella.

The enrichment papers are: “Hacker Ethics” by Dorothy E. Denning, and “The Social Impact of Computer-Mediated Voting” by Arnold Urken.

The National Conference on Computing and Values was a major undertaking that required significant help from many people. The Editors would like to express sincere thanks to the National Science Foundation and the Metaphilosophy Foundation for support that made the project possible. And we wish to thank the following people for their invaluable help and support: (in alphabetic order) Denice Botto, William Bowersox, Aline W. Bynum, Robert Corda, Donald Duman, Richard Fabish, James Fullmer, Ken W. Gatzke, Steven J. Gold, Edward Hoffman, Rodney Lane, Sheila Magnotti, Armen Marsoobian, John Mattia, P. Krishna Mohan, Beryl Normand, Robert O’Brien, Daniel Ort, Anthony Pinciaro, Amy Rubin, Brian Russer, Elizabeth L.B. Sabatino, Charlene Senical, J. Philip Smith, Ray Sparks, Larry Tortice, Suzanne Tucker.

The National Conference on Computing and Values (NCCV) was held on the campus of Southern Connecticut State University in August 1991. The Conference included six “tracks”: Teaching Computing and Human Values, Computer Privacy and Confidentiality, Computer Security and Crime, Ownership of Software and Intellectual Property, Equity and Access to Computing Resources, and Policy Issues in the Campus Computing Environment. Each track included a major address, three to five commentaries, some small “working groups,” and a packet of relevant readings (the “Track Pack”).

This monograph contains the proceeding of the “Teaching Computing and Human Values” track of NCCV. It includes three background readings, the “track address” with four commentaries, the conference bibliography, and a report on the activities and findings of the small working groups on teaching computer ethics.

The background readings are: “What Is Computer Ethics?” by James H. Moor, “Integrating Computer Ethics into the Computer Science Curriculum” by Keith Miller, and “A ‘Capstone’ Course in Computer Ethics” by Donald Gotterbarn.

The track address is “Computer Ethics in the Computer Science Curriculum” by Terrell Ward Bynum; and the commentaries include: “Non-Apologetic Computer Science Education” by C. Dianne Martin and Hilary J. Holz, “Realities of Teaching Social and Ethical Issues in Computing” by Doris Keefe Lidtke, “The Use and Abuse of Computer Ethics” by Donald Gotterbarn, and “Courting Culture in Computer Science” by Batya Friedman.

Keith Miller was the “Track Coordinator” for this track, and the Appendix of this monograph is his report on the activities and findings of the small working groups of the track.

The National Conference on Computing and Values was a major undertaking that required significant help from many people. The Editors would like to express sincere thanks to the National Science Foundation and the Metaphilosophy Foundation for support that made the project possible. And we wish to thank the following people for their invaluable help and support: (in alphabetic order) Denice Botto, William Bowersox, Aline W. Bynum, Robert Corda, Donald Duman, Richard Fabish, James Fullmer, Ken W. Gatzke, Steven J. Gold, Edward Hoffman, Rodney Lane, Sheila Magnotti, Armen Marsoobian, John Mattia, P. Krishna Mohan, Beryl Normand, Robert O’Brien, Daniel Ort, Anthony Pinciaro, Amy Rubin, Brian Russer, Elizabeth L.B. Sabatino, Charlene Senical, J. Philip Smith, Ray Sparks, Larry Tortice, Suzanne Tucker.